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Abstract 
Background: In Norway, children and adolescents under a specific age have been exempted 
from co-payment when they consume health care service provided by a GP. The age threshold 
for co-payment has been raised several times in the country. At the latest revision, the 
threshold was raised from 12 to 16 years of age effective July 1, 2010. Previous studies found 
that exemption from co-payment led to an increase in consumption of health care. However, 
there seems to be scarcity of studies investigating the effect of exemption from co-payment on 
the number of GP contacts by adolescents in the Scandinavian region. The socio-economic 
environment of the countries studied seems to be different from the Norwegian context.  
Aim: The aim of the study was to investigate if exemption from co-payment was significantly 
associated with an increase in the number of GP contacts among adolescents.   
Method: All adolescents born in 1998, 1996 and 1994 and who had at least one GP contact in 
one or more of three observation years constituted the study sample (N=357,724). A sample 
consisting of three birth cohorts allowed analysis of the effect of co-payment policy on 
adolescents of different ages. The data was obtained from the KUHR database of the 
Norwegian Directorate of Health. A Poisson regression model was fitted because the 
dependent variable was a count data and had non-normal distribution. GLM was used to fit a 
Poisson regression so that the dependent variable – GP contacts – is linearly related to the 
explanatory variables via a log-link function. The model was controlled for possible 
confounders including patient’s sex, age, birth cohort, proportion of contacts with male GP, 
and proportion of contacts with non-specialist GP. 
Results: Mean GP contacts of 9-17 year-old adolescents was 3.06 [95% CI (3.05 , 3.07)] per 
year. Adolescents exempted from co-payment had significantly more GP contacts when 
compared with their peers who were not eligible for exemption (p-value < 0.005). Marginal 
effect of exemption, ceteris paribus, was predicted and exemption from co-payment was 
associated with an increase of 0.26 GP contacts in a year. This means that adolescents not 
required to share the cost of health care, increased their number of GP contacts by 0.26 per 
year compared to their peers who paid the co-payment fee. Patient’s gender, age and birth 
cohort were also found to have significant association with the number of GP contacts. 
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Conclusion: Exemption from co-payment is significantly associated with an increase in the 
number of GP contacts among adolescents. The findings uncover the importance of raising 
the age threshold further to exempt young people in their late adolescence as older 
adolescents are responsive to exemption from co-payment and have more health care needs 
compared to younger adolescents. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Cost-sharing has been widely used, at least in the health care systems of western countries, 
with all its merits, drawbacks, and differential effect on health care users from different socio-
economic groups (Olsen, 2009; Folland et al, 2013). One of the main mechanisms of cost-
sharing is co-payment where a patient, as an insured party, is required to pay a flat fee per unit 
of health care service (Robinson, 2002). A change in co-payment was found to have 
significant effect on the demand for health care service. An inverse relationship between co-
payment and level of health care consumption was previously reported and the ultimate 
objective of co-payment has been to control unnecessary consumption or to generate 
additional revenue to finance health care provision (Nolan, 2007; Winkelmann, 2004). Thus, 
co-payment results in financial burden to health care users.   
The burden of out-of-pocket payment, which is conventionally measured as a share of total 
household income or by its share of total household consumption, constituted 3.4% as a share 
of final household consumption in Norway in 2009. This was slightly higher than the average 
for OECD countries of 3.2% (OECD, 2011). However, Norwegian children and adolescents 
under a specific age limit have been exempted from co-payment for medical services provided 
by GPs regardless of the economic situation of their parents. Health care provided by GPs to 
adolescents has been fully subsidized by the National Insurance System (NIS).  
There are various justifications for subsidizing primary health care for adolescents. Firstly, 
health can sustain by ensuring better access to adequate and appropriate preventative health 
care for adolescents (Kleinert, 2007). That is, the establishment of relationships with the 
health care system during adolescence is considered important to provide necessary and 
timely support for healthy lifestyles and to provide interventions for those with unhealthy 
behaviours (Zimmer-Gembeck et al, 1997). Secondly, improving access to vulnerable social 
groups enables a health care system to ensure more equitable distribution of health care to 
users (Olsen, 2009). 
It can be claimed, at this point, that exemption from co-payment provides adolescents with 
better access to primary health care by removing financial burden related to consumption of 
the service. Therefore, exemption from a co-payment fee that imposes financial burden of not 
more than a moderate level, is expected to significantly increase adolescents’ demand for 
health care which is defined in the present study as the number of GP contacts per year.  
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However, our expectation of increased use of health care by adolescents due to their eligibility 
for exemption has not been supported with sufficient context relevant evidence. There seems 
to be scarcity of literature about the effect of removing co-payments on health care demand 
among adolescents in the Scandinavian region generally and in Norway specifically. 
Furthermore, the socio-economic context of the countries studied seems to be different from 
the Norwegian context. The scarcity of context-relevant evidence of association between 
exemption from co-payment and health care consumption among adolescents was, therefore, 
the reason for conducting the present study.  
This scarcity of evidence is not without consequence. There is a possibility for less efficient 
allocation of resources without addressing equity issues when information relevant to 
economic decision-making is lacking. Scarcity of information that could be used as input in 
economic decision-making may lead to uncertain outcomes.  
The aim of the study was to investigate if exemption from co-payment was significantly 
associated with an increase in the number of GP contacts among adolescents. Thus, the 
question was: 
Did adolescents exempted from co-payment have more number of GP contacts as compared 
to their peers who were required to pay a co-payment fee?  
Based on this question, the following three hypotheses were formulated:  
i. Adolescents who had been exempted from co-payment had significantly more GP 
contacts when compared with their peers who paid co-payment fee.  
ii. Consumption of health care provided by GPs increase with age during adolescence. 
iii. Raising the age threshold for co-payment provides older adolescents with better access 
to primary health care.   
The present study responded to the aforementioned research question by confirming the 
existence of significant association between exemption from co-payment and increased 
number of GP contacts among adolescents by using data from recent years and fitting a 
Poisson regression model.     
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The thesis is organized in eight chapters. Chapter 1 is the introduction to the thesis and 
includes the research objective and hypotheses. Chapter 2 presents background information 
on Norwegian and international experiences. Chapter 3 raises health issues of adolescents. 
Chapter 4 includes the theory of health care demand and theoretical explanations of co-
payment. Furthermore, the peculiar aspects of health demand are presented in this chapter. 
Chapter 5 is devoted to study methods, presents the study design, describes the sample, 
defines the variables used, and explains the analytical model. In chapter 6 descriptive statistics 
and regression results are presented. Discussion of findings, strengths and limitations, and 
policy implications are included in chapter 7. Chapter 8 is used to conclude.  
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2 BACKGROUND 
Treatment costs were mentioned by patients as one of the main reasons for not receiving 
health care (OECD, 2011). Thus, it becomes relevant and of high significance to study the 
influence of out-of-pocket payments on the demand for health care service provided by GPs.  
2.1 The Norwegian experiences 
In Norway primary health care by GPs has been provided within the context of a Patient-List 
System (PLS) the objective of which is to improve the accessibility and quality of service by 
ensuring that every inhabitant in the country has the right to register with a regular GP. Close 
to 100 per cent of the general Norwegian population and GPs participate in the system 
(Iversen and Lurås, 2008). 
Patients are required to pay a co-payment fee in order to share the treatment cost with a public 
health insurer – NIS – when they consume health care service provided by a GP. The amount 
of income a GP earns for each consultation consists of a fee-for-service and a capitation fee 
for each patient in the patient list of the GP, both reimbursed by NIS, and a co-payment fee 
directly paid by the patient. In 2010, for example, the capitation fee was NOK 372 per patient 
per year. In the same year, co-payment for GP consultation was NOK 136 if the GP did not 
have specialist status in general medicine, and NOK 180 if the GP were specialist in general 
practice (Onlinelege, 2011).  
As part of the Norwegian health system’s effort to secure universal coverage of high quality 
health service, children and adolescents under the age of 16, pregnant women, patients living 
with HIV/AIDS, young people under the age of 18 who receive treatment from a 
psychologist, and those who have reached an upper limit for out-of-pocket payments have 
been exempted from co-payment (HELFO, 2013). Since age is one of the factors that 
influence utilization of health care with some evidence of a U-shaped relationship between 
age and service utilization (Scott, 2000), exemption of young people in their early and middle 
adolescence is meant to remove financial burden of health care service and encourage them to 
make use of the service at times of need. For this reason, the age threshold for co-payment in 
Norway has been raised several times so that those who previously had to pay co-payment 
fee, no longer have to. Accordingly, the age threshold for co-payment was raised from 12 to 
16 years of age at the latest revision on July 1, 2010.  
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The effect of co-payment depends on the financial burden of the fee paid out-of-pocket by the 
patient. A substantial change in the amount of co-payment is likely to have an effect of a price 
in influencing the demand for health care (Folland et al, 2007). This implies that exemption 
from co-payment can have an effect on health care consumption if the fee paid out of pocket 
was considered to be substantial by the patients. In the Norwegian health care system, out-of-
pocket payments accounted for 37% of total costs; seen as a proportion of total health care 
expenditure, out-of-pocket payments made up 15% in 2009, reflecting moderate level of cost-
sharing requirements (Lindahl and Squires, 2011), which implies that exemption thereof may 
have actual moderate effect on increasing the demand for primary health care services 
provided by GPs. However, the relatively small co-payment fees and the presence of a limit 
on personal health care expenses in the form of deductibles, were not considered to be barriers 
to health care service in Norway and Sweden (Holm et al, 1990).    
2.2 International experiences 
International experiences of co-payment have revealed the effect of changes in co-payment 
fees on reducing or increasing health care consumption. Nolan (2007) studied the effect of 
exemption from co-payment on the number of GP visits in Ireland. During the study period, 
all individuals were eligible for universal public health insurance by paying a significant 
amount of co-payment fee for GP visits. However, the poor and the unemployed were 
exempted from co-payment and they had a “medical card” that entitled them to free medical 
care. The size of the population who effectively face a zero monetary cost in visiting their GP 
due to such eligibility was estimated to be nearly 30% of the total Ireland’s population.  By 
using panel data from the dataset known as Living in Ireland Survey of 1995-2001, the 
aforementioned author compared GP visits of the exempted group with the non-exempted 
group. By controlling for demographic, socio-economic and health status characteristics, a 
comparison of medical card patients and private patients, who pay the full cost out-of-pocket, 
showed that exemption from co-payment through medical card eligibility was one of the few 
non-need factors that had significant effect on GP visits. Having a “medical card” which 
entitled the patient to completely free care, led to an increase of 0.33 GP visits per year. The 
author considered this marginal effect of 0.33 GP visits to be a large difference between the 
consumption levels of the exempted group and co-payment fee payers.       
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Based on German experiences, Winkelmann (2004) conducted a natural experiment to study 
the indirect effect on doctor visits of co-payment fees that increased up to 200% by the 
German health care reform of 1997. Using a differences-in-differences method he found that 
an increase in co-payment fees for prescription drugs reduced not only the consumption of 
prescription drugs, but also the number of doctor visits by about 10% on average. This study 
compared social groups exempted from the increase in co-payment which included people 
with private insurance, children under the age of 18, and poor people, with the group that was 
required to pay higher co-payment fee. The main purpose of raising the co-payment fee in 
Germany was to reduce cost of health care by reducing excessive consumption of prescription 
drugs; because an estimated quarter of all prescriptions received by patients did not have 
confirmed therapeutic benefits.  
RAND health insurance experiments are widely known studies from the USA that discuss the 
effect of cost-sharing on health care consumption. Based on such experiments, Keeler (1992) 
presented the effect of cost-sharing on health care consumption. The experiment randomly 
assigned 5809 people to insurance plans that either had no cost-sharing, or 25%, 50%, or 95% 
co-insurance rates. Several findings worth noting were presented from this experiment. One 
of the findings indicate that, if patients were required to pay the full bill of treatment, the 
actual health care spending of the patients would have fallen as low as half of the total health 
care cost they received for free. This is because cost-sharing reduces the number of treatment 
episodes of all kinds. The findings also showed that there was a differential effect of cost-
sharing on socioeconomic groups with poor people being less likely to seek care in a year and 
more likely to be hospitalized, when compared with the richer counterparts, regardless of the 
extent of the co-payment fee charged. This raises equity issues of cost-sharing as poor people 
are more adversely affected.  
The RAND health insurance experiment also revealed that cost-sharing has health effects on 
health care consumers. The people who were exempted from cost-sharing had better health 
results at the end of the study on blood pressure control, corrected vision, and oral health. 
Thus, cost-sharing has a wide range of effects including reduction in total health care 
spending, reduction in demand for health care, more adverse effects on poor people and 
poorer health results to those who are required to pay out-of-pocket payments.     
Another study of RAND Health Insurance Experiment investigated the effect of cost-sharing 
on the use of medical services by children under the age of 14 years (Leibowitz et al, 1985). 
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1,136 children participated in this experimental study which entitled parents of some of the 
children to 100% reimbursement of the children’s health care costs, and let the rest of the 
parents pay out-of-pocket 95% of the cost of medical care for their children. The findings of 
this experiment showed that for both younger and older children, the probability of having at 
least one visit for medical care decreased as the proportion of cost-sharing increased and as 
the children’s age increased. As a result of cost-sharing, the average number of outpatient 
visits also decreased.        
All the aforementioned country experiences of cost-sharing and its effect on demand for 
health care agree in their findings that cost-sharing is inversely related to demand for health 
care for both adults and children regardless of socio-economic factors of the country under 
consideration. The present study builds on these and other relevant literature. The unit of 
analysis is an adolescent patient in an observation year. Its findings are expected to contribute 
to the existing literature by estimating the association between exemption from co-payment 
and adolescents’ demand for health care service provided by GPs. It may also be used to 
identify important research questions.   
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3  HEALTH AND ADOLESCENTS 
3.1 Health care needs of adolescents 
Adolescents’ access to adequate and appropriate health care is advocated for by researchers 
and practitioners alike in order to enable health care systems to tackle the health challenges of 
young people. A review of teenagers’ perceived needs and access to primary health care in the 
United Kingdom (UK) found that a substantial minority, up to 30% depending on the 
problems, reported to have had unmet health care needs (Gleeson et al, 2002). The concern 
with poor access to health care by adolescents stems also from the fact that adolescents with 
poor health status were most likely to report underutilization of health care facilities and 
unmet health needs (Britto et al, 2001). Unmet health care needs related to mental health, 
sexual health, and lifestyle problems especially drug and alcohol abuse was uncovered in a 
study of 12-17 year-old adolescents (Epstein et al, 1989). Such health problems and lifestyle 
factors are possible predictors of ill health in adult life and are partly preventable (Hetlevik et 
al, 2010).  
According to Kleinert (2007), overweight and obesity, among young people, have been 
increasing in developed countries, and for the first time there is now a danger of a substantial 
drop in life expectancy with chronic diseases, such as diabetes and early signs of 
cardiovascular disease appearing in teenagers and young adults. Taking these challenges into 
consideration, there is a need to view adolescent health as an opportunity, and not just as a 
challenge, in order to sustain health and wellbeing both in adolescence and adulthood. A 
study from Scotland described the lack of mental well-being in 15 year-olds as undiscovered 
iceberg when a study revealed that the self-reported rate of psychiatric morbidity was nearly 
seven times greater than that suggested by the same study participant’s medical records (Potts 
et al, 2001). Thus, these and other related accounts of health care needs of adolescents justify 
the use of mechanisms that enable adolescents to establish stronger relationships with the 
health care system for adequate and timely service (Zimmer-Gembeck et al, 1997).     
3.2 The need for adolescent friendly health care 
One of the five components of WHO’s framework for the development of youth-friendly 
health services is the provision of free or affordable health services for young people (Tylee et 
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al, 2007). The main factors that reduce the number of young people’s contact with their GP 
were found to be service fee and delayed delivery of service (Tylee et al, 2007; Gleeson et al, 
2002). Furthermore, children’s and adolescents’ health is influenced by the financial resource 
of their parents and strong association was found between low income of parents and poor 
health outcomes of children (Lucas et al, 2012). Poor health outcomes in childhood often 
sustain in adulthood. These previous findings imply that the removal of health care fees make 
health care service adolescent-friendly and enables adolescents to have better access and 
utilization of health care services. 
A focus on building the health stock of adolescents is expected to contribute to avert the 
noticed drop in life expectancy. This means, investment in children’s and adolescents’ health 
through fully subsidized primary health care is justified due to the opportunities it renders for 
sustained health through provision of adequate and appropriate preventative health care.     
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4 THEORY OF HEALTH CARE DEMAND 
4.1 Primary health care  
Primary care is widely perceived to be the backbone of a rational health service system. At 
least in Europe, the general practitioner is often considered to be the type of practitioner who 
delivers primary health care. A GP is defined as a physician providing personal, primary, and 
continuing medical care to individuals and families where the long-term relationships are the 
defining element of general practice (Burke et al, 1993). Some of the peculiar features of 
primary health care include affordable cost, first-level contact, and first elements of a 
continuing health care process. Thus, a GP is regarded as the main point of entry to health 
care services. In addition to the health care service they provide, GPs ensure the provision of 
necessary medical service by directing and linking a patient to a private specialist or a 
hospital. Patients’ contact with the health care service depends largely on their contact with a 
GP. A strong primary care orientation of a health care system renders the primary care in 
general and GP services in particular accessible in order to attain better health levels.  
According to Starfield (1994), countries that had a higher average score than their 
counterparts for primary care orientation were found to have a population of better health 
levels. That is, among western industrialized nations, a primary care orientation of a country’s 
health service system was found to be associated with lower costs of care, higher satisfaction 
of the population with its health services, better health levels, and lower medication use. 
Average score for primary care orientation in each of the 11 countries studied was computed 
first based on 11 features of primary care among which family centeredness, first-contact 
care, comprehensiveness, and coordination were the characteristics that reflected the 
performance of primary care practice. The countries were ranked according to their primary 
care scores and these ranks were compared with “outcome” indicators including level of 
patient satisfaction and health levels as measured by 14 health outcome indicators. The 
findings reasserted that primary care orientation of a health care system was associated, 
among others, with better health levels. Measures that improve access to health care provided 
by GPs indicate strengthening of primary health care orientation.      
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4.2 Health care demand 
4.2.1 Aspects of health demand 
The demand for health differs from the traditional approach to demand in many ways (Folland 
et al, 2013). Consumers purchase health care because they want to improve their health or to 
protect it from a decline. The demand for health care arises due to the consumer’s demand for 
health; thus, demand for health care is a derived demand. In other words, the demand for 
health care depends largely on the consumer’s judgement about the utility they get directly or 
indirectly from their health, and not by the utility they get from consuming the health care 
service itself. However, people do not confine themselves to meeting their demand for health, 
only through the consumption of health care service purchased at the market. Rather, they 
actively produce health by having better life style and health promoting behaviours including 
better diet, physical exercise, and active engagement in social activities, as well as avoidance 
or minimisation of risk behaviours such as smoking and excessive alcohol consumption. 
Consumers, as rational decision-makers, do not want to make unnecessary spending out of 
their pocket. In order to reduce unnecessary medical care spending, they actively produce 
health and protect themselves from disease. Thus, requirement of cost-sharing incentivises 
people to actively produce health.         
Health gained by the use of medical care or own health producing efforts lasts for more than 
one period making health to have an attribute of a capital good that does not normally 
depreciate within the period consumed. A person’s stock of health capital determines the 
ultimate output of healthy state of life that includes physical health, mental health, and social 
activity. Better access to health care is, therefore, important for healthy state of life of the 
health care consumer. A healthy state of life is desired for two benefits. Firstly, it makes 
people have better satisfaction in life as they feel good due to better heath; secondly, it 
positively influences the productivity and ability of people to earn more income. While the 
benefit is related to health as a consumption good, the second benefit emphasizes the 
importance of health as an investment good that generates long-term benefit.  
The amount of health stock depends on the amount of investment made in terms of time and 
money in which case the latter depends in return on the price of health care services and drugs 
that influence the demand for health care. Thus, health capital and its improvement, rate of 
depreciation, or sustainability partly depends on the investment made in building the health 
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stock which in turn depends on the ability and willingness of the consumer to invest in 
improving health capital. An individual’s decision to invest in health capital is done in the 
context of patient payment arrangement in a given health care system. The arrangement may 
require a patient to pay the full cost or only a certain percentage of the cost of health care. A 
generous health care system may provide health care service without requiring the patient to 
make out-of-pocket payments. Detailed theoretical explanation of patient payment 
arrangements is available in Section 4.2.3. 
4.2.2 The patient as a consumer of health care 
As health demand differs from the traditional approach to demand, the patient also differs 
from a consumer of an ordinary good. Olsen (2009) discussed how a patient is viewed as an 
‘autonomous consumer’ and a ‘compliant consumer’ who visits a physician first based on 
one’s own autonomous decision and who afterwards tends to comply to recommendations of 
the physician. Both autonomous and compliant decision-making behaviours of a patient are 
present due to the peculiar characteristics of the health care market. The peculiar 
characteristic is that the patient lacks diagnostic and treatment information. By virtue of their 
professional expertise, physicians possess information about the impact of health care on 
health and effectiveness of alternative treatments. As a result of this information asymmetry, a 
patient is inclined to delegate decision making concerning whether or not to consume health 
care to the physician. When a patient’s demand for health care is influenced by a physician’s 
recommendation concerning whether or not to consume health care, we call the patient a 
compliant patient.  
The extent of demand for health care by a compliant patient partly depends on the incentives 
the physicians attach to their own recommendations. A physician induced demand, which is 
the health care demand of a compliant patient, is expected to be higher in health care market 
where the physicians have financial incentive to recommend more health care service. This 
happens when physicians are reimbursed by a third party payer according to the units of 
service consumed by the patient.  Based on the trust patients have on physicians they are 
likely to comply with the physician’s recommendations. In addition to this, physicians who 
focus only on satisfying the needs of an individual patient by disregarding the interest of the 
third-party payer would recommend more health care, in terms of quantity and quality, than if 
the patient had to pay out of their own pocket. Thus, in the case of demand for health care, the 
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demand that occurs based on the patient’s own decision and demand induced by a physician 
are inseparable. It is worthwhile to note that in the present study demand encompasses all GP 
contacts regardless of whether they were made by a ‘compliant patient’ or by an ‘autonomous 
consumer’. Generally, induced demand is more common among health care consumers who 
are exempted from cost-sharing arrangements than patients required to make out-of-pocket 
payment.    
4.2.3 Effect of co-payment on health care demand               
Patients are required to share the cost of health care consumed with a third party payer who 
subsidises them. There are direct and indirect cost-sharing (Rubin and Mendelsen, 1995). 
Direct cost-sharing refers to an arrangement where fees are directly imposed on patients when 
they make use of health care services. Co-payment and deductibles are among the user fees 
that are directly imposed on patients. In the case of deductibles, the service user is required to 
pay the first specified amount of health care cost before insurance coverage begins. Co-
payment, which is the main focus of the present study, is imposed as a flat fee per health care 
service. 
Figure 1 illustrates the effect of co-payment on demand for health care. The illustration was 
borrowed from Folland and co-authors (2013); an alternative source is Barros and Martinez-
Giralt (2012). Health care consumption varies with changes in the amount of co-payment fee 
paid by the patient. The amount of and limits to out-of-pocket payment have effect on a 
society’s ability to achieve efficient allocation of resources. Efficient allocation occurs when 
the cost of delivering the health care service to the market (marginal cost) equals to the 
amount the consumers are willing to pay for the service (marginal benefit).  
The demand for care by a consumer is illustrated under three different situations of insurance, 
assuming that the individual’s demand for health care is price elastic. We also assume that the 
marginal cost of care, P0, is constant regardless of the different insurance situations. In the 
first situation the patient is assumed to be uninsured and has to bear the full cost of health 
care, P0; thus, she prefers to consume Q0 units of health care. This shows that, based on the 
consumer’s preferences, the marginal benefit which is described by point A on the demand 
curve, D0, equals the marginal cost, P0, showing an efficient allocation of resources for 
society. The price, P, reflects the cost of health care to the society and includes costs related 
to time, transport, and the cost of bringing the service to the market.  
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 In the second situation, the consumer has a health insurance contract where she is required to 
pay only a co-payment fee, P1, which is, for example, equal to 20 per cent of the health care 
bill. The demand curve, D1, was generated leading to a new equilibrium quantity demanded 
Q1. Thus, the incremental cost of the service provided is P0 × (Q1 – Q0), or the rectangle 
ABQ1Q0. The incremental benefit to the consumer is represented by the area ACQ1Q0. Since 
the consumer is now consuming more health care than is optimal, the resulting loss in well-
being is represented by triangle ABC. In other words, this loss in well-being has occurred 
because the incremental cost of delivering health care service ABQ1Q0 is larger than the 
marginal benefit ACQ1Q0 by triangle ABC.  
In the third situation, where there is exemption from co-payment, the consumer receives full 
insurance coverage for a net price of P = 0. Her consumption of health care is fully 
subsidized. The demand curve in this situation is labelled with D2 and the consumer’s demand 
for health care increases now from Q1 to Q2. In such insurance situation, the total health care 
expenditure to society is P0Q2; this expenditure is fully borne by the insurer. The fully 
covered patient limits her demand at Q2 because of costs related to time, transport and other 
factors that result in cost when consuming health care. A change from the first situation to the 
third situation, results in incremental cost AEQ2Q0 and incremental benefit of AQ2Q0. Since 
the incremental cost exceeds the incremental benefit, the loss in well-being is AEQ2. This 
means that the society’s loss of well-being is larger in situations where consumption of health 
care is fully subsidised than in situations where consumers are required to pay a co-payment 
fee. In other words, exemption of health care consumers from co-payment results in less 
efficient allocation of resources as compared to requiring consumers to share cost of health 
care provided.   
The explanations, above, reveal that insurance implicitly subsidises insured types of care 
relative to other types of care; it also subsidises insured types of care relative to non-health 
goods. The subsidy leads to distortion in allocation of resources in a society and this distortion 
is larger when there is exemption from co-payment than when co-payment fee is applied in 
the insurance system.  
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Figure 1. Effect of co-payment on health care demand.
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5 STUDY METHOD 
5.1 Data and sample 
In an effort to respond to the research question, I have employed a cohort study design. Data 
from three cohorts were pooled to estimate the number of GP contacts assuming that the slope 
coefficients and variances of the three cohorts were identical. The data was pooled because 
the features of the data available did not allow the use of other designs such as differences-in-
differences estimator by employing panel data analysis. The reason for choosing cohort 
design was to make use of the advantage of large sample and to avoid selection bias. 
5.1.1 Data and its source 
The data used for the present study was obtained from the KUHR database which was owned 
by the Norwegian Directorate of Health. KUHR functions pursuant to the Norwegian National 
Insurance Act and consisted of, among others, data related to reimbursement to GPs for the 
health care service they provided to primary health care service users. The report sent by each 
GP is required to contain data about the GP (ID, type of business, code of practice 
municipality), patient (ID, sex, age, code of residence municipality), treatment (time of GP 
contact, amount reimbursed, type of service rendered), and diagnosis (Cappelen, 2012).   
The advantage of using the database was that the data files supplied to the researcher were 
without missing values except for the residence municipality of the patients during the first 
two observation years. However, KUHR did not include some of the variables that were 
relevant for the present study.  This has caused the exclusion of some possible confounders 
from the fitted model. Furthermore, only those who had at least one physician contact in a 
given calendar year were included in the database causing non-inclusion of a sizeable 
proportion of cohort members with zero GP contacts.      
5.1.2 The sample 
The sample included three birth cohorts.  These were cohort 1994, 1996 and 1998. By cohort, 
it is meant the calendar year in which the adolescents were born. The reason for selecting 
these three cohorts was to allow comparison among various age groups on the one hand, and 
between the exempted and non-exempted groups on the other hand. Because the age threshold 
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for co-payment was raised from 12 years to 16 years of age effective July 1, 2010, we decided 
to include those who were 15 year-old adolescents in the year 2011 which was the last 
observation year in the present study. 
While birth cohort 1994 was not exempted throughout the observation years, birth cohort 
1998 was eligible for exemption throughout the study period. The birth cohort in the middle – 
birth cohort 1996 – was not required to pay co-payment fees during the first and the last 
observation years; but did during the second observation year. This mix of cohorts has 
enabled to have a good representation of the exempted and co-payment fee paying 
adolescents. The sub-samples that constituted the study sample are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1. Sample overview of the number of observations by cohort and observation year (age in 
parenthesis) (N=357,724).  
                                                                               Observation years 
  2007 2009 2011 
Cohort 1994  34,411 (13)   40,984 (15)  47,001 (17) 
1996  37,428 (11)  39,004 (13)  44,930 (15) 
 1998  35,877 (9)  38,181 (11)  39,908 (13) 
                              
                                                                       
The KUHR database consists of only patients who had at least one physician contact during a 
given observation year. Thus, the sample in the present study (N=357,724) included 
adolescents from the aforementioned three cohorts who had at least one GP contact in a given 
observation year. A patient’s GP contacts in one observation year were assumed to be 
independent of his/her GP contacts in a different observation year. Therefore, the same 
individual who had GP contact, for example, in observation years 2009 and 2011 but not in 
2007, was counted twice in the sample. Thus, the unit of analysis is a patient in an observation 
year.   
 
Exempted  Not-exempted 
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5.1.3 Ethics 
The subjects in the study were represented by a pseudo identification number when the data 
were retrieved and sent for the study by the Norwegian Directorate of Health; thus, 
anonymous data.   
5.2 The dependent and predictor variables 
5.2.1 Dependent variable 
The dependent variable was the number of GP contacts counted in a given observation year. 
GP contacts in the present study was defined to mean any type of contact with the purpose of 
receiving health care service from a GP and that results in out-of-pocket payment to the user 
if not eligible for exemption from co-payment. Included in the variables are, simple GP 
contacts such as a visit to a GP by the patient or a third party representing the patient; contact 
through writing or telephone call that may result in issuance of a prescription or sick leave 
certificate; GP consultation; and a visit by the GP to the patient (“sykebesøk”). 
The dependent variable was measured by counting the number of GP contacts in a year where 
the minimum and maximum values were 1 and 8, respectively.      
5.2.2 Predictor variables 
The following is a brief explanation of the predictor variables used in the present study. Only 
variables for which data could be found in the KUHR database were used. 
Exempted was the main explanatory variable and it refers to the adolescents who were not 
required to pay out-of-pocket when receiving health care service from a GP. In this dummy 
variable, “payer” was the reference category and it refers to those adolescents who were not 
exempted from co-payment. In order to obtain more accurate estimate of the effect of 
exemption from co-payment, the model was controlled for the following potential 
confounders.    
Boy was a dummy variable for the adolescent’s gender where “girl” was the reference 
category.   
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Cohort 1994 denotes a birth cohort and it is defined to mean the adolescents who were born in 
1994. Birth “cohort 1998” was the reference category.    
Cohort 1996 denotes a birth cohort and it is defined to mean the adolescents who were born in 
1996. Birth “cohort 1998” was the reference category. 
Age of the adolescent refers to the time period, in years, from birth to year of observation. The 
same adolescent who had been observed in three different observation years had accordingly 
three different ages in the dataset. “Age” was a continuous variable with values 9, 11, 13, 15 
and 17.   
Proportion of contacts with male GP (Propor_m) refers to the proportion of contacts an 
adolescent had with a male GP in an observation year. The values of the variable are in the 
interval (0, 1). Physician gender influenced physician contacts (Gleeson et al, 2002).     
Proportion of contacts with non-specialist GP(Propor_ns) refers to the proportion of contacts 
an adolescent had with a GP who was not specialized in general practice. Physician 
specialisation influenced physician contacts (Bornstein et al, 2000).    
A brief definition of the variables and related descriptive statistics are presented in Tables 2 
and Table 3, below. Table 2 shows variables used in the analytical model and their operational 
definitions in brief. Eight variables were used.  
Table 2. Definition of variables. 
Variable Definition 
GP_contacts A dependent variable expressed as a count of GP contacts. 
Exempted DUMMY, = 1 if patient was exempted from co-payment; 0 otherwise. 
Boy DUMMY, = 1 if patient was a boy; 0 otherwise.  
Cohort 1994 DUMMY, = 1 if patient was born in 1994; 0 otherwise. 
Cohort 1996 DUMMY, = 1 if patient was born in 1996; 0 otherwise. 
Age Age of patients in years. 
Propor_m Proportion of contacts with male GP. 
Propor_ns Proportion of contacts with non-specialist GP. 
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With the exception of Age, Propor_m and Propor_ns, all of the independent variables were 
dummy variables. Table 3 shows that mean age was 13.18 years and the average number of 
GP contacts was 3.06.   
Table 3. Global descriptive statistics (N=357724). 
Variable Mean Std. dev. 
GP_contacts 3.06 2.22 
Exempted 0.45 0.50 
Boy 0.50 0.50 
Cohort1994 0.52 0.50 
Cohort1996  0.52 0.50 
Age 13.18 2.34 
Propor_m 0.67 0.42 
Propor_ns 0.52 0.44 
 
5.3 Study model and data analysis 
5.3.1 Poisson regression model 
The random variable in the present study is a count of the number of GP contacts during an 
observation year. When the response variable is in the form of a count, there is a need to fit a 
regression model that is appropriate for count data. Counts are all positive integers and a 
Poisson distribution, rather than a normal distribution, is more appropriate since the Poisson 
mean > 0; a peculiar feature of Poisson distribution is that the dependent variable has variance 
equal to the mean (Hill et al, 2012).   
The natural logarithm of the response variable is linked to a linear function of predictor 
variables in the fitted log-linear model as shown in equation 1, below:    
ln(GP contactsi) =  β0 + β1 Exemptedi + β2 Boyi + β3 Cohort1994i + β4 Cohort1996i + β5 Agei +   
                              β6 Propor_mi + β7 Propor_nsi,                                                                          (1) 
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where: ln(GP contacts) is the natural logarithm of the number of GP contacts, 
 β0 is the intercept,  
 β1,…, β7 are the coefficients of the corresponding predictor variables, and 
 i denotes an observation number; for example, Exemptedi is indicator whether there 
              exemption in the observation under consideration.     
Linking the dependent variable to the factors and covariates on the right hand side of equation 
1, above, we have a log-linear model where a coefficient, for example β1, represents the 
expected change in the logarithm of GP contacts due to a change in the predictor variable – 
Exempted. In order to predict GP contacts based on the coefficient of the predictors, we take 
the anti-logarithm:  
GP contactsi = exp[ln(GP contactsi)] = exp(β0 + β1 Exemptedi + β2 Boyi + β3 Cohort1994i +   
                                                              β4 Cohort1996i + β5 Agei + β6 Propor_mi + β7 Propor_nsi).    (2) 
Where: exp is the base of a natural logarithm with a value of 2.71828. 
In this model, the value obtained by exponentiating a coefficient of a variable, for example, 
exp(β1 Exemptedi) is referred to as the relative rate ratio (RRR) and is used to measure the 
effect of the predictor variables in the present study. Conditional mean GP contacts were 
predicted based on the combined effects of the exponentiated terms on the right side of 
equation 2, above.   
In studies where the dependent variable in a regression model is a count of number of 
occurrences of an event, there is often interest in explaining and predicting probabilities. 
Predicting the probability of making different number of GP contacts during a year was done 
in the present study using Poisson probability distribution. Considering Y to be the number of 
GP contacts in the present study, if Y is a Poisson random variable, then its probability 
function is: 
 ( )   (   )   
     
  
            ,                                                                                     (3) 
where λ is the mean of Y, and y is any number of GP contacts for which we estimate the 
probability of occurrence. In this function, the mean is assumed to be equal to the variance; 
22 
 
thus, λ is also the variance. In a regression model we try to explain the dependent variable 
E(Y), that is the predicted GP contacts, as a function of some explanatory variables. Keeping 
the value of E(Y) ≥ 0, we define Poisson regression model for count data as follows: 
E(Yi) = λi = exp(β0 + β1 Exemptedi + β2 Boyi + β3 Cohort1994i + β4 Cohort1996i + β5 Agei +  
                   β6 Propor_mi + β7 Propor_nsi).                                                                                         (4) 
Poisson distribution can be used to approximate the binomial probabilities in situations where 
the number of trials, n, is large and the probability, P, of occurrence of an event is small. In 
such situations is estimated that λ = nP (Newbold et al, 2010).    
5.3.2 Data preparation and model selection  
When the dataset was received from the Norwegian Directorate of Health, data related to the 
same person were presented in multiple rows depending on the difference in the gender and 
specialization status of the GPs contacted during a given observation year. For example, if a 
patient had contact with a male GP and a female GP in the same observation year, the GP 
contacts were entered separately in two rows because the two GPs contacted were of different 
sex. Likewise, if a patient had contact with a GP who had specialist status in general practice 
and with another GP who was not specialist in general practice, the number of GP contacts for 
the same patient were entered in two different rows; one for each GP type. Thus, the data set 
was restructured using SPSS in a way that all of a person’s number of GP contacts and values 
of predictor variables were entered in one row to suit for the fitted Poisson regression model. 
As part of the data restructuring and transforming processes, Propor_m and Propor_ns were 
respectively, computed as proportion of GP contacts with a male GP and with a non-specialist 
GP, based on the original integer values of the number of GP contacts with a male GP and 
with a non-specialist GP.     
Before the regression model was fitted, descriptive analyses were conducted using histograms 
and percentiles to study the distribution of the data with emphasis on examination of outliers 
and extreme values. Outliers and extreme values were handled by winsorizing the values for 
dependent variable at 95 percentile of the sample which gave eight GP contacts as the 
maximum value of the dependent variable.   
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SPSS version 20 was used as it has a feature that supports the analysis of count data with non-
normal distribution. The Generalized Linear Models was used to fit Poisson regression. When 
the model was tested to examine if the distribution of the data fits a Poisson model, there was 
a significant difference (Pearson chi-square, p < 0.05) implying possibility of overdispersion 
in the data.  
Given this indication of overdispersion, negative binomial distribution was found to be the 
best alternative and thus a negative binomial model was fitted. However, there was no change 
in regression coefficients and significance level when a negative binomial model was fitted. 
An indication of overdispersion can be present in a Poisson distribution due to one or more 
factors, including omission of relevant variables from the model, the functional forms 
specified may be incorrect, or there may be dependence between the events that constitute 
each count (Berk and MacDonald, 2008). Family income, parents’ education level, distance to 
health care centre and urban-rural differences were found to be variables that influenced 
access to and hence demand for health care (OECD, 2009; Berra et al, 2009; Vila et al, 2012).  
Since these variables were not included in the model, the significant variation (p < 0.05) 
observed in the test of goodness-of-fit of the Poisson model in the present study was likely to 
have resulted due to the omission of these variables and seems not to be a real overdispersion. 
Thus, I decided to use Poisson regression given the fact that negative binomial did not change 
the parameter estimates and the marginal effect of exemption on the number of GP contacts; 
refer appendices III and IV. The estimated marginal means for the exempted and payer groups 
were the same both in Poisson and negative binomial models. This means that the predicted 
probabilities of the number of GP contacts for the exempted and payer groups is the same 
when computed based on these two models.     
. 
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6 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
6.1 Descriptive analysis 
The number of patients from each birth cohort that was observed during each of the three 
observation years and their proportion to total sample has been presented in Table 4. The 
number of observations related to birth cohorts 1994 and 1996 constituted about 34.2% and 
33.9% of the total sample. 31.9% of the observed patients were from cohort 1998. 
Furthermore, we see that the proportion of observations related to the three cohorts increased 
with observation years indicating that the number of adolescents that had at least one GP 
contact increased with time.  
Table 4. Number of patients from a birth cohort across three observation years, their   
proportion relative to the total sample and mean number of GP contacts. 
Cohort  No. of patients Proportion 
% 
Mean GP 
contacts 
1994 122,396 34.2  
 Observation year    
 2007 34,411 9.6 2.64 
 2009 40,984 11.5 3.18 
 2011 47,001 13.1 3.66 
1996 121,363 33.9  
 2007 37,428 10.4 2.79 
 2009 39,004 10.9 2.86 
 2011 44,930 12.6 3.44 
1998 113,966 31.9  
 2007 35,877 10.0 2.76 
 2009 38,181 10.7 2.88 
 2011 39,908 11.2 3.02 
Total sample  357,724 100.0  
 
Interestingly, mean GP contact was also increasing with time. Comparison among birth 
cohorts show that cohort 1994 had the largest mean GP contacts both in 2009 (3.18) and in 
2011 (3.66). GP contacts of this birth cohort increased by 0.54 between 2007 and 2009, and 
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by 0.48 between 2009 and 2011. In the case of birth cohort 1996, GP contacts increased by 
0.58 between observation years 2009 and 2011. Comparatively speaking, this was the only 
increment for this cohort that can be considered large. The increase in GP contacts of cohort 
1998 was only 0.12 between 2007 and 2009, and 0.14 between 2009 and 2011. Stated 
differently, it can be noted that the increase in GP contacts of birth cohort 1998 was less than 
one-third as compared to the increase observed among cohort 1994. The trend of an increase 
in GP contacts among adolescents is also demonstrated schematically in Figure 2.  
Figure 2, below, shows an increasing trend in GP contacts of all birth cohorts studied. After 
the year 2007 patients from birth cohort 1994 had the highest number of GP contact on 
average and the schematic illustration in the Figure indicates a steep increment. Birth cohorts 
1996 and 1998 had almost the same number of GP contacts during the first two observation 
years. However, in 2011, GP contacts of cohort 1996 diverged greatly from that of cohort 
1998 and approached to GP contacts of cohort 1994. Generally the trend of increasing GP 
contacts with time imply that age of patients is an important explanatory variable.       
Figure 2. A trend of GP contacts by birth cohorts across the observation years.* 
                    
*’Cohort’ in the figure indicates the year of birth of the adolescents with cohort 
1994 being the oldest adolescents in the sample.  
Descriptive statistics related to patient characteristics have been presented in Table 5. Number 
of observations, mean GP contacts with 95% confidence interval, standard deviation and 
number of GP contacts corresponding to three quartiles of the sample has been shown. On 
average, girls had a larger number of GP contacts as compared to boys. However, no 
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difference was seen when compared based on median GP contacts. Birth cohorts 1994 and 
1998 had the largest and the smallest mean GP contacts, respectively. The confidence interval 
for mean GP contacts related to all patient characteristics are narrow indicating high precision 
of our estimate which could be attributed to the large sample size and low variability in GP 
contacts. 
Comparison between the group exempted from co-payment and the group required to pay co-
payment fee shows that the payer group had larger mean GP contacts even though median GP 
contacts of the two groups do not show difference. Birth cohort 1994 which was indicated to 
have the largest mean GP contacts in Table 4 had never been exempted from co-payment 
during the three observation years. This birth cohort seems to inflate mean GP contacts of the 
group not-exempted from co-payment as reported below in Table 5.  
Table 5. Descriptive statistics by patient characteristics (N=357724)*. 
Patient  
characteristics 
N Mean GP 
contacts 
Std. 
dev. 
95% Confidence 
interval 
Percentiles 
25% Median 75% 
Boys 180,537 2.94 2.15 2.93 – 2.95 1 2 4 
Girls 177,187 3.17 2.29 3.16 – 3.18 1 2 4 
Exempted 196,324 3.00 2.18 2.99 – 3.01 1 2 4 
Payer 161,400 3.13 2.22 3.11 – 3.14 1 2 4 
Cohort 1994 122,396 3.21 2.31 3.20 – 3.22 1 2 5 
Cohort 1996 121,362 3.05 2.22 3.04 – 3.06 1 2 5 
Cohort 1998 113,966 2.89 2.12 2.88 – 2.91 1 2 5 
*Data related to patients from three birth cohorts were polled to estimate mean GP visits per 
observation year.  
Table 6, below, shows the number of individuals from each age group that was observed; the 
proportion an age group constitutes of the total sample; mean GP contacts; and the number of 
GP contacts at 25
th
, 50
th
 and 75
th
 percentile of the sample. The 13 year-old adolescents 
constituted the largest proportion of the sample. Mean age of participants was 13.18 years. In 
this Table, it can be clearly seen that mean GP contacts is increasing with the age of the 
adolescents with the youngest group of participants having 2.76 as compared to 3.66 GP 
contacts among the oldest adolescents in the sample. It can also be noted that the increment 
becomes larger after the age of 13.  
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Linking the results in Table 6 to those shown in Table 5, we can notice that the mean GP 
contacts of 13 year-old and younger adolescents is below the mean GP contacts of both co-
payment paying and exempted groups which may imply that older adolescents are the main 
contributors to mean GP contacts among both those exempted and not exempted adolescents. 
Median GP contact is also higher among the 15 and 17 year-old adolescents as compared to 
the younger counterparts. Likewise, the 15 and 17 year-old adolescents had five GP contacts 
at 75
th
 percentile of the sample in contrast to only four contacts among the younger age 
groups. In relation to this, Appendix I presents the number of GP contacts at percentiles of 
high resolution for the three birth cohorts in different observation years. Especially in 
observation year 2011, the oldest adolescents had more GP contacts at lower percentiles of the 
cohort sub-sample.   
Table 6. Descriptive statistics by age (N=357724)*. 
Age No. of 
observations 
Proportion 
of sample 
Mean GP 
contacts 
Std. 
dev. 
Percentiles Min Max 
25% Median 75% 
9 35,877 10% 2.76 2.037 1 2 4 1 8 
11 75,609 21% 2.83 2.086 1 2 4 1 8 
13 113,323 32% 2.85 2.109 1 2 4 1 8 
15 85,914 24% 3.32 2.337 1 3 5 1 8 
17 47,001 13% 3.66 2.459 2 3 5 1 8 
* Age was computed based on year of birth and the year during which the adolescent was observed. 
Adolescents from different birth cohorts can have the same age based on the year of observation. 
Figure 3 shows GP contacts of co-payment paying and exempted adolescents across various 
ages. The Figure indicates that only 13 and 15 year-old adolescents had experience as co-
payment fee payers in one year and as exempted persons in another year. Thus, the 
comparison in this Figure may focus only on these two ages. The schematic presentation 
indicates that the 13 and 15 year-old patients exempted from co-payment had larger mean GP 
contacts as compared to the same-aged peers who were required to pay co-payment fee. 
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Figure 3. Comparison of GP contacts of co-payment fee payers and exempted 
adolescents across various ages*. 
                                                                    
*In the sample, only 13 and 15 year-old adolescents had experience with co-
payment and exemption from co-payment.  
Figure 4 shows a comparison of the average number of GP contacts of adolescents required to 
pay co-payment fee and those exempted adolescents of the same gender. The Figure shows 
that among boys, the exempted adolescents had more GP visits. In the case of girls, those 
subject to co-payment fee had substantially more GP contacts than the exempted counterparts. 
This could be due to the fact that medical conditions and diseases of women increase in 
adolescent girls with age and the girls in the cohort of the oldest adolescents in the sample had 
never been exempted from co-payment. Mean age of the exempted and co-payment fee 
paying girls was 12.0 and 14.8 years. When no distinction was made between payers and 
exempted groups, mean GP contact of girls and boys was 3.17 and 2.94 GP contacts, 
respectively. Both gender groups had 1, 2, and 4 GP contacts at the 25
th
, 50
th
, and 75
th
 
percentile of the sample. Boys and girls constituted 50.5% and 49.5% of the total sample, 
respectively.         
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Figure 4. Gender specific comparison of GP contacts of co-payment fee 
payers and exempted adolescents.* 
    
*The adolescents were from three birth cohorts. Mean age of the exempted 
and not-exempted adolescents was 11.9 and 14.7, respectively.  
6.2 Model results 
In the descriptive analyses, in section 6.1, we saw that adolescents with such characteristics as 
older age, co-payment fee payers, girls, and those belonging to birth cohort 1994 had more 
GP contacts as compared to their counterparts in each of the descriptive comparisons. 
Regression model results have been presented in this section in order to get more accurate 
estimates by controlling the model for the explanatory variables presented in Section 5.2.2.       
A Poisson regression model was used to estimate GP contacts among adolescents. Omnibus 
test of goodness-of-fit showed that the fitted model significantly outperformed the intercept 
model (likelihood ratio chi-sq. = 7743.3, df = 7, p < 0.005). No serious violation of 
assumptions for fitting Poisson regression was observed.    
6.2.1 Estimated marginal means 
Table 7 shows the model estimated marginal means, standard errors and confidence intervals 
for predictors of number of GP contacts at the factor levels of patient’s gender, co-payment, 
and birth cohort. The estimated marginal means tell us the mean GP contact for each factor 
adjusted for variables in the model. Thus, the adjusted effects of the factors are presented.  
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Similar to the results in the descriptive statistics, the Table shows that girls had more GP 
contacts as compared to boys. However, contrary to the results in the descriptive statistics, the 
estimated marginal means show that the number of GP contacts was larger among the 
adolescents exempted from co-payment as compared to their counterparts who were not 
exempted.  
Mean GP contacts for the predictor birth cohort ranged from a low of 2.99 for cohort 1994 to 
3.10 for cohort 1998. This shows us that adjustment for other variables in the model changed 
mean GP contacts for cohort 1998 from being the smallest (2.89) as shown in Table 5 in the 
descriptive analysis to being the largest (3.10) as shown here in Table 7. 
Table 7. Estimated marginal means at levels of variables used to 
predict GP contacts (N=357724). 
Variable  
categories 
Mean 
GP contacts 
Std. 
error 
95% CI     
Lower      Upper 
Boys 2.93 0.005   2.92          2.94 
Girls 3.14 0.005   3.13          3.15 
Exempted 3.15 0.007   3.14          3.17 
Payer 2.91 0.008   2.90          2.93 
Cohort 1994 2.99 0.100   2.97          3.01 
Cohort 1996 3.00 0.007   9.99          3.02 
Cohort 1998 3.10 0.011   3.08          3.12 
6.2.2 Adjusted effect of predictor variables 
Regression coefficient, standard error and confidence interval for predictors of GP contacts 
have been presented below in Table 8. Adolescents exempted from co-payment had 
significantly (p < 0.005) more GP contacts as compared to those who paid co-payment fee 
[RRR: 1.082, 95% CI: (1.074 , 1.092)]. This means, in a year, GP contacts of those exempted 
from co-payment was estimated to be 8.2% higher than that of adolescents who were not 
eligible for exemption.  
Comparison between gender groups showed that boys had significantly (p < 0.005) fewer 
number of GP contacts than girls [RRR: 0.932, 95% CI: (0.928 – 0.937)]. This indicates that 
the number of GP contacts among boys was 6.8% less compared to that of girls.  
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Compared with birth cohort 1998 (reference cohort), both of the other two cohorts had 
significantly less GP contacts (p < 0.005). Birth cohort 1994 [RRR: 0.964, 95% CI: (0.952 – 
0.976)] and birth cohort 1996 [RRR: 0.969, 95% CI: (0.962 – 0.975)] had respectively, 3.6% 
and 3.1% less GP contacts as compared to birth cohort 1998.  
Age of patients was also significantly (p < 0.005) associated with the number of GP contacts 
[RRR: 1.054, 95% CI: (1.052 – 1.055)]. This means each additional year of age in 
adolescence is associated with approximately 5.4% increase in GP contacts. A five year 
increase in the age of the patient who is of an adolescent age, is associated with a RRR of 
(1.054)
5
 = 1.30. This is about a 30% increase in GP contacts for an adolescent who is five 
years older, other things being constant.   
Both the proportion of contacts with a male GP (p = 0.374) and proportion of contacts with a 
non-specialist GP (p = 0.274) did not have statistically significant association with the number 
of GP contacts.  
Table 8. Poisson regression for predictors of GP contacts of adolescents from three birth cohorts who 
were observed in 2007, 2009 and 2011 (N=357724)*. 
Predictor variable Β Std. error 95% Confidence interval  
Lower Upper 
Intercept 0.427 0.0099 0.407 0.446 
Exempted 0.079 0.0045 0.071 0.088 
Boy  -0.070 0.0024 -0.075 -0.065 
Cohort 1994  -0.037 0.0064 -0.049 -0.024 
Cohort 1996  -0.032 0.0037 -0.039 -0.025 
Age 0.053 0.0007 0.051 0.054 
Propor_m 0.003 0.0029 -0.003 0.008 
Propor_ns 0.003 0.0027 -0.002 0.008 
*Refer appendix II for more detailed version of Table 8.  
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6.2.3 Prediction of probability of GP contacts in a year 
The probability of making different number of GP contacts by patients has been predicted 
using the Poisson probability function. Figure 5 shows comparison of the probability of 
making different number of GP contacts by co-payment fee payers and exempted adolescents. 
In order to compute the probability distribution, I have used the estimated marginal means for 
the exempted and payer groups as λ values in the formula for Poisson probability function. 
These means are reported in Table 7, above.      
Figure 5. Probability predicted by Poisson probability function for 
the number of GP contacts per year of the co-payment payers and 
exempted adolescents*. 
 
*Adolescents from three birth cohorts with at least one GP contact 
in an observation year were included. Data was not available for 
adolescents with zero number of GP contacts.    
As it can be seen in Figure 5, the probability of making 0, 1, or 2 GP contacts was higher 
among co-payment fee payers than among the exempted adolescents. For example, the 
probability of making 2 GP contacts was 23% among the non-exempted and 21% among the 
exempted counterparts. However, the probability of making 3 GP contacts in a year was 
exactly the same among both the exempted and payer groups. Beyond 3 GP contacts, the 
exempted adolescents had higher probability of making a GP contact. 
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6.2.4 Predicted marginal increment in GP contacts 
 
In this section we predict the marginal increment in GP contacts that is associated with 
exemption of adolescents from co-payment. The computation can be done by assuming 
different conditions for a patient based on the variables we have used in the regression model. 
Predicted GP contacts for the following patient conditions have been analyzed for illustration 
purposes. 
Condition 1: A 15 year-old boy from birth cohort 1996 who had been exempted from co-
payment was considered in condition 1. 
To obtain the predicted number of GP contacts, we take the anti-logarithm of the fitted log-
linear model, which is the exponential function: 
GP contactsi = exp(Intercept + 0.079 Exemptedi – 0.07 Boyi – 0.037 Cohort1994i –   
            0.032 Cohort1996i + 0.053 Agei + 0.003 Propor_mi + 0.003 Propor_nsi)  
= exp(0.427 + 0.079×1 – 0.070×1 – 0.037×0 – 0.032×1 + 0.053×15 
   + 0.003×1 + 0.003×1).           
 = exp(1.205)  
  = 3.34 is the predicted number of GP contacts for the individual  
              specified in condition 1. 
Then we compare the predicted increase in GP contacts for the individual in condition 1 with 
a peer who is required to pay co-payment fee. All other things are the same as in condition 
one. 
Condition 2: A 15 year-old boy from birth cohort 1996 who had been required to pay co-
payment fee.  
GP contacts = exp(Intercept + 0.079 Payer – 0.07 Boy – 0.037 Cohort1994 –   
                        0.032 Cohort1996 + 0.053 Age + 0.003 Propor_m + 0.003 Propor_ns) 
                     = exp(0.427 + 0.079×0 – 0.070×1 – 0.037×0 – 0.032×1 + 0.053×15 
                        + 0.003×1 + 0.003×1)         
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                     = exp(1.126)  
                     = 3.08 is the predicted number of GP contacts for the individual  
                         specified in condition 2. 
The difference of 0.26 (3.34 – 3.08) GP contacts per year is the increase in GP contacts 
associated with exemption from co-payment. This means that the average number of GP 
contacts of adolescents exempted from co-payment is estimated to increase by 0.26 per year.  
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7 DISCUSSION 
There seems to be scarcity of evidence about the association between a change in co-payment 
and the demand for GP services among 9-15 year-old adolescents in the Scandinavian region 
generally and in Norway specifically.  
The extent of change in the number of GP contacts that is associated with the change in co-
payment fee has been examined in the present study. The findings are, therefore, intended to 
fill the existing knowledge gap about the aforementioned association. 
Discussion of findings 
Three hypotheses were specified at the outset of the study. The first hypothesis states that 
exemption from co-payment that is considered to have no more than moderate financial 
burden is associated with an increase in health care consumption. By controlling the model for 
patient’s gender, birth cohort, age, proportion of contacts with a male GP and proportion of 
contacts with a non-specialist GP, it has been found that exemption from co-payment is 
significantly (p < 0.005) associated with an increase in GP contacts among adolescents [RRR: 
1.082, 95% CI: (1.074 , 1.092)]. The marginal effect of exemption is on average 0.26 GP 
contacts per year. This shows that adolescents who face zero monetary cost at the time of GP 
contact increase their number of contacts by 0.26 per year compared to their peers who pay 
co-payment fee. Thus, the first hypothesis in the study has been supported with the findings.  
In agreement with the present findings, a study from Ireland has previously found that the 
poor and unemployed people, who were exempted from co-payment, had 0.33 more GP visits 
as compared to those who were not entitled to free health care service; this increase of 0.33 
was considered to be large (Nolan, 2007). Thus, the marginal effect found in the present study 
may be considered to be of moderate change.      
The marginal effect in the present study is equivalent to an 8.2% increase in the number of GP 
contacts associated with a change of an adolescent from being required to share cost to being 
eligible to free health care. In Norway, out-of-pocket payments accounted for 37% of total 
costs (Lindahl and Squires, 2011). This out-of-pocket payment has the effect of a price on the 
demand for health care. Full exemption from cost-sharing indicates, therefore, a 100% 
reduction of the cost borne by the service users, which is associated with about 8.2% increase 
in GP contacts. In his German study of an indirect effect on GP visits of an increase in co-
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payment for prescription drugs, Winkelmann (2004) found a reduction in visits by 10% in 
response to an increase in co-payment for prescription drugs by up to 200%.  
In addition to the findings of the present study discussed above, the results from the Poisson 
probability distribution (Figure 5) shows more clearly the significance of the change in co-
payment in influencing the number of GP contacts. The probability of making 0, 1, or 2 GP 
contacts was higher among the co-payment fee payers as compared to the exempted group. 
However, beyond the average number of GP contacts, which is about 3 GP contacts, the 
probability of making 4 or more GP contacts was higher among the exempted adolescents. 
Adolescents who had four or more contacts with a primary health care physician were 
referred to as frequent health care attenders (Vila et al, 2012). Taking this designation into the 
present study, we can note that the probability of being a frequent health care attender is 
higher among the exempted adolescents. Since the aim of the present study was not to 
investigate whether or not exemption from co-payment leads to excessive consumption of 
health care among adolescents, at this point, we do not know if the increased frequency of GP 
contacts indicates overconsumption of health care. However, we can give due consideration to 
the generally acceptable viewpoint that cost-sharing arrangements leads to a reduction in 
unnecessary use of health care and to instil an appreciation by health care users of the true 
value of health care provided free at point of use (Folland et al, 2013).                       
Although an increase of 0.26 GP contacts, as found in the present study, is not large relative 
to the average number of GP contacts (3.06), it indicates that exemption from co-payment has 
been perceived by the adolescents and their families to have some significance in removing 
financial burden related to health care consumption. If co-payment fees are perceived by 
patients to be too small to have effect on total household consumption, exemption thereof is 
not expected to increase health care consumption. When a change in co-payment is 
considered substantial, it has an effect of a price on health care consumption (Folland et al, 
2007). In 2009 the burden of out-of-pocket payment, which is conventionally measured as a 
share of total household income or by its share of total household consumption, constituted 
3.4% as a share of final household consumption in Norway. This was slightly higher than the 
average for OECD countries which was 3.2% (OECD, 2011). Is this financial burden 
significant enough to deter access to health care in Norway? It seems we have an answer to 
this questions from a study done 20 years ago: “[t]he relatively low fees, together with the 
limit on expenses (in the form of deductibles) for consultations in Norway and Sweden, are 
37 
 
probably not something that make people abstain from seeking care” (Holm et al, 1990, p. 
324). Furthermore, it is worthwhile to note the findings of previous Norwegian studies that 
investigated association between family income and health care consumption among 
adolescents. A study of health-care-seeking behaviours of 15-16 year-old, 10th grade students 
in Oslo have found that there was no association between adolescents’ health care utilisation 
and the family’s economic situation or a parent’s unemployment (Haavet et al, 2005). 
However, the present study shows, even in a country like Norway where the burden of cost-
sharing is generally understood to be not substantial, statistically significant association has 
been found between exemption from co-payment and better access to primary health care 
provided by GPs.  
The second hypothesis in the present study states that adolescents’ consumption of health care 
increases with their age. Descriptive analysis (Table 6) shows the number of GP contacts 
ranges on average from as low as 2.76 among nine-year-olds to as high as 3.66 GP contacts 
among 17 year-old adolescents. Having a close examination of the figures in the Table, one 
can notice the increase in the number of GP contacts was small up to the age of 13. 
Comparatively speaking, the increase becomes larger starting from the age of 15.  
When the regression model was adjusted for potential confounders, age in adolescence was 
found to have significant (p < 0.005) association with the number of GP contacts [RRR: 
1.054, 95% CI: (1.052 – 1.055)]. Health care consumption during adolescence increases with 
age. An increase of one year in the age of an adolescent is associated with a 5.4% increase in 
the number of GP contacts giving on average a marginal effect of 0.18 GP contacts per one 
additional year. Thus, the second hypothesis has been supported. From previous studies age 
was generally found to be a determinant of health care consumption with small children and 
older people consuming more health care service than the rest of the population (Scott, 2000).   
The third hypothesis states that raising the age limit for exemption of older adolescents 
enables them to have their increased need for health care met. Age-specific comparison of GP 
contacts by co-payment fee payers and exempted adolescents showed more health care 
consumption among adolescents entitled to free health care both at the age of 13 and 15 
(Figure 3). The difference between average number of GP contacts of exempted and co-
payment paying adolescents of the same age was about 0.27 contacts per year.                   
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Thus, the results from the age-specific comparison of GP contacts of the co-payment fee 
paying and exempted adolescents, and the relatively large increase in health care consumption 
especially after the age of 13, uncover one noteworthy finding; that is, as health care needs of 
adolescents increase with their transition to middle adolescence, eligibility to free health care 
provide them with better access to health care. This finding supports the third hypothesis. It 
indicates that as adolescents’ need for health care increases with age, exemption from co-
payment creates a more favourable health care environment for adolescents as it enables them 
to become practical users of health service. Based on the fact that age remained to be 
significant determinant of health care demand even after controlling for eligibility for free 
medical care and health status, Nolan (2007) has indicated the possibility of greater awareness 
of good health as age increases. This implies that exemption from co-payment enables to 
reduce forgone health care among older adolescents by reducing financial barrier to access. A 
previous study of foregone health care among adolescents from the USA has found older age 
in adolescence to be associated with increased risk of foregone health care; the older the 
adolescent the greater is the risk of foregone health care (Ford et al, 1999).  
Our study also finds association between gender and health care consumption among 
adolescents where boys have significantly (p < 0.005) smaller number of GP contacts than 
girls (RRR = 0.932, 95% CI: 0.928 – 0.937). This denotes that boys consume GP services 
6.8% less than that of girls’ consumption. In other words, the increase in health care 
consumption associated with being a girl has been found to be 0.24 GP contacts. A previous 
study of the influence of socioeconomic variables on the demand for primary health care in 
the Netherlands, also found that the influence of sex was large and significant with women 
being more frequent physician consulters than men (van der Gaag and van de Van, 1978). 
Even though the population in their study were mostly adults, the findings from the previous 
study and from our study show that the differential effect of gender is similar in older and 
younger age populations.    
The present study has not found significant association between health care consumption and 
GP’s sex. This finding is consistent with findings from a previous study (Hetlevik et al, 2010). 
Furthermore, whether or not a GP was a specialist in general practice does not have 
association with the number of GP contacts among adolescents.    
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Strengths and limitations    
Given the relevance of the variables considered in determining health care demand, and the 
consistency of the study results with previously published findings of association between 
exemption from co-payment and increased health care consumption, I reassert that the 
findings of the present study represent the real-life associations of the variables examined. 
The results of association between exemption from co-payment and increased number of GP 
contacts coincide with the theory of price elasticity of demand, which has been used as the 
theoretical framework in the present study. Furthermore, there is little possibility of under- or 
over-reporting and no missing values in the selected variables. The register-based cohort 
study has enabled to avoid problems related to selection bias; thus a reasonable level of 
validity of results. I could not see problematic measurement errors that seriously reduce the 
reliability of the data register used for the study.  
However, the investigated associations could have been better explained if additional 
variables had been controlled for as potential confounders in the present study. Travelling 
distance and physician density are among several variables that determine access to and 
consumption of health care service (OECD, 2011). Due to time constraints, the data file used 
in the present study was not linked with related data sources that were found under the 
ownership of organizations other than the Norwegian Directorate of Health.      
Another limitation in the study was the inability to link the data file that consists of only those 
who had at least one GP contact, with a data file that consists of members of the same birth 
cohort who had zero contact with a GP in an observation year. The inclusion of adolescents 
who had zero GP contacts would have enabled us to provide more comprehensive information 
about GP contacts. Most of the limitations in the present study are mainly related to time 
constraints.  
Policy implications 
Given the strengths of the study, the findings can be generalized to populations with similar 
demographic and socio-economic contexts. Although the marginal increment in the number of 
GP contacts was not large, it can be generalized that there is statistically significant 
association between exemption from co-payment and increased health care consumption 
among adolescents. The association of exemption with increased consumption of health care 
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has implications for two important policy issues: efficiency and equity in the provision of 
health care service.  
The trade-off between efficiency and equity is an important issue in health care policy. 
Through its impact on allocation of resources and services, exemption from cost-sharing 
increases both inefficiency and equity in an economy. As illustrated in Section 4.2.3, 
exemption reduces allocation efficiency by increasing the loss in well-being. The loss in well-
being is higher in a situation where there is exemption from cost-sharing than in a situation 
where service users are required to pay a co-payment fee. Loss in well-being results because 
the marginal cost of consuming a subsidized health care service is greater than the marginal 
benefit enjoyed by the consumer. This means that even though both co-payment and 
exemption cases result in loss in well-being, the loss is larger in the latter case. Allocative 
efficiency is reduced when the incremental cost is greater than the incremental benefit. 
Allocative efficiency refers to the situation in which resources are put to their best possible 
uses in the economy so that no further gains in output or welfare are possible (Folland et al, 
2013). The fully subsidised service, as in the case of exemption, causes distortion in the 
allocation of resources making it difficult to achieve policy objective of efficiency.  
The indirect effect of removal of co-payment on adolescents’ demand for health care provided 
by school nurses and health stations is also a policy-relevant issue. GP services are thought to 
be more costly than the same type of services provided by a school nurse or by a health 
station at least due to the difference in labour cost of the service provided. However, 
exemption of adolescents may lead to a shift from consumption of services provided by a 
school nurse or a health station to GP services even though the service sought is still provided 
by the first two less costly primary health care providers. This reduces cost efficiency.  
According to Olsen (2009), cost efficiency refers to the ability to provide the same level of 
services with the cheapest possible combination of resources. The provision of free GP 
services implies that there is possibility for the third party payer to pay more for the same type 
of service. Furthermore, exemption from co-payment leads to more public health spending 
and hence less efficiency especially if the exempted consumers tend to over-utilise health care 
because of their eligibility to subsidised service (Folland et al, 2013). As a policy issue, the 
public spending implication of exemption needs to be considered in light of the benefits the 
society obtains from exemption. 
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As a benefit, exemption enables a health care system to ensure equitable distribution of health 
care to vulnerable social groups by removing financial barriers to access. Equity means 
fairness in the distribution of health care or ensuring equal access to people with equal needs 
for health care (Olsen, 2009). The fully subsidised GP services improve access to health care 
especially for people with less ability to pay for it. This means that exemption supports users 
to get appropriate and timely primary health care in general and preventative services in 
particular. Zweifel and Manning (2000) have noted that the consumption of preventative 
health care services decline with increasing out-of-pocket money price, and preventative care 
is more responsive to price than is the demand for other medical services. Through its 
influence for equitable distribution of health care, exemption responds to the needs of socio-
economic groups that would delay or forgo needed health care due to financial difficulties 
(OECD, 2011). Since adolescents are dependent on their parents for financial resource, their 
willingness to visit a health care provider may be constrained by the lack of their own 
financial resource, especially if they do not want their parents to know about their contact 
with a GP in general and their sickness in particular.                  
The findings of the present study show that the number of GP contacts increase with age in 
adolescence and the oldest adolescents ever exempted (15 year-olds) had more GP contacts 
than their same-aged peers who were required to pay co-payment fee. Thus, I suggest for 
revision of the existing policy on exemption in order to raise further the age threshold for co-
payment with the intention of exempting adolescents who are older than 15 years of age. Such 
a revision strengthens the adolescent-friendliness of the Norwegian health care system and 
supports the use of adolescent health as opportunity to sustain health. However, as the present 
study provides only partial information for decision-making, revisions may be considered in 
relation to efficiency considerations.   
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8 CONCLUSION 
To my knowledge, this is the first study of association between exemption from co-payment 
and adolescents’ primary health care consumption in Norway. Since there has been scarcity of 
context relevant information of such association, the findings of the present study are 
expected to fill the knowledge gap about this association in a Scandinavian context. 
Information produced from this study may have significance for allocative efficiency as the 
study findings reflect the preference of health care consumers in relation to exemption from 
co-payment.   
In agreement with the claim made, the study finds a significant association between 
exemption of adolescents from co-payment and increased consumption of primary health care 
service provided by GPs. The statistically significant increase in the number of GP contacts 
indicates that in a health care market characterized by elastic demand, adolescents and their 
parents are responsive to a moderate or smaller change to service price. When we interpret 
this finding it may be said that exemption from co-payment is one of the main factors that 
contribute to adolescent friendly health care service. Starting from the lowest age limit in 
adolescence, primary health care consumption increases with age indicating that health care 
needs increases with age among adolescents. This was found among both the exempted and 
co-payment fee paying adolescents. The fact that 13 and 15 year-old adolescents who were 
eligible for fully subsidized GP services had more contacts than same-aged co-payment fee 
payers, has a policy implication for raising the age threshold further to exempt older 
adolescents. This can make the health care system more adolescent-friendly with a patient 
payment policy that strengthens the capacity of the health care system to meet contemporary 
challenges of adolescent health.   
It is also worth noting that girls in their adolescence ages consume more primary health care 
than boys indicating that gender effect in health care consumption is present not only among 
adults but also among young people.             
Based on the present study, I suggest three areas for future research. Firstly, various health 
benefits may be expected as a result of exemption from health care. Thus, future research 
should focus on investigating association between exemption from co-payment and health 
benefits for adolescents. Secondly, the demand for health care services provided by school 
nurses and health stations might have decreased due to adolescents’ eligibility to free GP 
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services. It is, therefore, important to study the indirect effect of exemption from cost-sharing 
on adolescents’ demand for primary health care provided by school nurses and health stations. 
Thirdly, since one of the limitations of the present study was my inability to include 
additional relevant variables, I suggest for more research in order to examine the question of 
the present study by including additional relevant variables and by employing panel data 
analysis models. 
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Appendix 
Appendix I. Number of GP contacts in an observation year at different percentile of a birth 
cohort. 
 Observation year 2007 Observation year 2009 Observation year 2011 
 Cohort Cohort Cohort 
Percentile ‘94 ‘96 ‘98 ‘94 ‘96 ‘98 ‘94 ‘96 ‘98 
5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
15 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
20 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
25 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 
30 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 
35 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 
40 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
45 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 
50 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 
55 2 2 2 3 2 2 3 3 3 
60 2 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 
65 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 3 
70 3 3 3 4 3 3 5 4 4 
75 3 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 4 
80 4 4 4 5 4 4 6 6 5 
85 5 5 5 6 5 5 7 7 6 
90 6 6 6 7 6 6 8 8 7 
95 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
N = 34411 37428 35877 40984 39004 38181 47001 44930 39908 
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Appendix II. Poisson regression parameter estimates and  exp(B) with 95% confidence interval. 
Predictor variable B Std. 
error 
95% Confidence 
interval 
Hypothesis test Exp(B) 95% CI for Exp(B)  
Lower Upper       Wald    
Chi-sq. 
df Sig. Lower Upper 
Intercept 0.427 0.0099 0.407 0.446 1845.1 1 0.005 1.532 1.503 1.562 
Exempted = 1 0.079 0.0045 0.071 0.088   310.3 1 0.005 1.083 1.073 1.092 
Payer = 0 0
a
 . . . . . . 1.0 . . 
Boy = 1 -0.070 0.0024 -0.075 -0.065   847.5 1 0.005 0.932 0.928 0.937 
Girl = 0 0
a
 . . . . . . 1.0 . . 
Cohort1994 = 1
b
 -0.037 0.0064 -0.049 -0.024   33.4 1 0.005 0.964 0.952 0.976 
Cohort1996 = 1
b
 -0.032 0.0037 -0.039 -0.025   74.4 1 0.005 0.969 0.962 0.976 
Cohort1998 = 0 0
a
 . . . . . . 1.0 . . 
Age 0.053 0.0007 0.051 0.054 5062.6 1 0.005 1.054 1.053 1.056 
Propor_m 0.003 0.0029 -0.003 0.008       0.8 1 0.374 1.003 0.997 1.008 
Propor_ns 0.003 0.0027 -0.002 0.008       1.2 1 0.274 1.003 0.998 1.008 
a
Set to zero because this is the reference parameter. 
b
When one of these two variables takes the value of 1, the other one takes 0. 
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Appendix III. Negative binomial regression parameter estimates and exp(B) with 95% confidence interval. 
Predictor variable B Std. 
error 
95% Confidence 
interval 
Hypothesis test 
Lower Upper Wald Chi-
sq. 
df Sig. 
Intercept 0.432 0.0100 0.412 0.451 1882.5 1 0.005 
Exempted = 1 0.079 0.0045 0.070 0.088 312.6 1 0.005 
Payer = 0 0a . . . . . . 
Boy = 1 -0.067 0.0024 -0.072 -0.063 781.5 1 0.005 
Girl = 0 0
a
 . . . . . . 
Cohort1994 = 1
b
 -0.039 0.0063 -0.051 -0.026 37.3 1 0.005 
Cohort1996 = 1
b
 -0.033 0.0037 -0.040 -0.025 78.4 1 0.005 
Cohort1998 = 0 0
a
 . . . . . . 
Age 0.052 0.0007 0.051 0.054 4983.7 1 0.005 
Propor_m 0.003 0.0030 -0.003 0.009 1.1 1 0.291 
Propor_ns 0.003 0.0028 -0.002 0.009 1.2 1 0.275 
a
Set to zero because this is the reference parameter. 
b
When one of these two variables takes the value of 1, the other one takes 0. 
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Appendix IV. Predicted number of GP contacts using negative binomial regression 
coefficients. 
Condition 1: A 15 year-old boy from birth cohort 1996 who had been exempted from co-
payment was considered in condition 1. 
GP contacts = exp(Intercept + 0.079 Exempted – 0.067 Boy – 0.039 Cohort1994 –   
            0.033 Cohort1996 + 0.052 Age + 0.003 Propor_m + 0.003 Propor_ns)  
= exp(0.432 + 0.079×1 – 0.067×1 – 0.039×0 – 0.033×1 + 0.052×15 
   + 0.003×1 + 0.003×1).           
 = exp(1.197)  
  = 3.32 is the predicted number of GP contacts for the individual  
              specified in condition 1. 
Then we compare the predicted increase in GP contacts for the individual in condition 1 with 
a peer who is required to pay co-payment fee. All other things are the same as in condition 
one. 
Condition 2: A 15 year-old boy from birth cohort 1996 who had been required to pay co-
payment fee.  
GP contacts = exp(Intercept + 0.079 Payer – 0.067 Boy – 0.039 Cohort1994 –   
            0.033 Cohort1996 + 0.052 Age + 0.003 Propor_m + 0.003 Propor_ns)  
= exp(0.432 + 0.079×0 – 0.067×1 – 0.039×0 – 0.033×1 + 0.052×15 
   + 0.003×1 + 0.003×1).           
 = exp(1.118)  
                        = 3.06 is the predicted number of GP contacts for the individual 
The marginal effect = 3.32-3.06 = 0.26. It did not change when negative binomial was used. 
The predicted values were also very small. 
              
